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INTRODUCTION
Most prevailing environmental policies are based on compensating the agents who are damaging the environment or on making large investments 
in restoring natural reserves. An example of failure of these policies is illustrated here by comparing two large groundwater systems in Spain with 
contrasting management strategies. The appeal of the case stems from the fact that the Eastern La Mancha aquifer is being managed almost 
sustainably. In stark contrast, its neighboring Western La Mancha aquifer is being grossly mismanaged. The results engage two major questions 
from previous groundwater literature. The first question is whether aquifer management needs policy intervention. The answer depends upon the 
consideration and magnitude of environmental damages in the model. The second question addresses the nature of groundwater policies. The 
empirical findings challenge the current approach to environmental policies and call for policy efforts focused on nurturing stakeholders’ collective 
action and on supporting the necessary institutional setting.
REFERENCESCONCLUSIONS
The results from La Mancha engage two major questions on groundwater management. The first 
question is whether or not “free market” approaches are good enough for groundwater 
management, or do aquifers need policy intervention? The theoretical results indicate that polices 
can improve social welfare substantially when environmental damages are considered, while “free 
markets” lead to ecosystem degradation coupled with depletion of resources for human activities.
The second question is: what should be the nature of policies needed for groundwater protection? 
The empirical results suggest that compensation payments to avoid damages through market 
instruments, or large investment schemes in nature protection have failed in Western La Mancha. 
Empirical results from the Eastern La Mancha aquifer indicate that policies that support collective 
action are needed. The huge 5.5 billion Euros in public expenditures by the Upper Guadiana Plan 
seem to be a misguided policy to recover the aquifer, because stakeholders’ cooperation requires 
serious commitments to manage and care for the aquifer, and cannot be exclusively bribed for by 
side payments.
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The valuation of the environment has been a swelling endeavor for environmental economists during past decades, with a plethora of scholarly 
discussions surrounding valuation procedures. However, the key issue in environmental policy is not the accuracy of valuation but rather how to 
internalize ecosystem damages into agents’ economic decisions. The current policy practice for protecting ecosystems consists of compensating 
interventions using market instruments for private benefits of local agents who cause the damages, or promotion of conservation programs for 
natural resource reserves using large investments by governments, international agencies and private foundations. Such policies seem ineffective 
in curtailing the massive degradation of natural resources and ecosystems worldwide.
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There are two basic economic approaches to deal with common pool resources, such as groundwater. One approach is the “Coase solution”, 
which is based on privatizing the resource, and the second approach is the “Pigou solution”, which is based on public ownership and taxation of 
extractions. Hardin has described how population pressures bring about the exhaustion of common pool resources, recommending privatization or 
public property coupled with access regulation. However, Ostrom has proposed an entirely different approach by questioning the idea that 
common property governance leads inexorably to tragedy. Ostrom looks at the empirical evidence of the management of common pool resources, 
and finds that coercive government rules fail because central authorities lack legitimacy and knowledge of local conditions. Stakeholders 
themselves have to design the rules and the enforcement mechanisms for the sustainable management of common resources. Also, interactions 
among stakeholders necessitate appropriate institutional settings from local to regional levels, in order to restrict access and create incentives to 
conserve resources.
The contrasting examples of two large aquifers in Southern Spain—the Western and Eastern La Mancha aquifers and the adjacent wetlands—reveal 
the mismanagement and failure of pure economic instruments in Western La Mancha. Conversely, the observed progress towards sustainable 
management in Eastern La Mancha due to the success of the collective action engaged by stakeholders
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Year 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 
Extractions, Eastern 
La Mancha (Mm3) 420 390 380 370 370 380 350 290 270 300 
Extractions, Western 
La Mancha (Mm3) 590 610 680 650 620 430 670 610 440 490 
Extractions during last decade
The contribution of this study is in the demonstration
of the efficacy of collective action by farmers in Eastern
La Mancha,  compared with the use of economic 
instruments (and lack of cooperation) in Western La 
Mancha. Economic instruments: payments of 200 million 
Euros in the 1990s and planned investments of 5.5 
billion Euros under the Upper Guadiana Special Plan 
